Saturday, September 10, 2011

Secrecy Killed on 9/11

Secrecy Kills

WHO IS RICH BLEE?

What do they have to say?

Read the joint statement in response to the video by CIA Director George Tenet, CTC Director J. Cofer Black, and Richard Blee of Alec Station.

Also see our email back and forth with Tenet, Black and Blee, and our reply to their joint statement.

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Joint Statement
from George J. Tenet, Cofer Black and Richard Blee

August 3, 2011

Richard Clarke was an able public servant who served his country well for many years. But his recently released comments about the run up to 9/11 are reckless and profoundly wrong.

Clarke starts with the presumption that important information on the travel of future hijackers to the United States was intentionally withheld from him in early 2000. It was not.

He wildly speculates that it must have been the CIA Director who could have ordered the information withheld. There was no such order. In fact, the record shows that the Director and other senior CIA officials were unaware of the information until after 9/11.

The handling of the information in question was exhaustively looked at by the 9/11 Commission, the Congressional Joint Inquiry, the CIA Inspector General and other groups.

The 9/11 Commission quite correctly concluded that “...no one informed higher levels of management in either the FBI or CIA about the case.”

In early 2000, a number of more junior personnel (including FBI agents on detail to CIA) did see travel information on individuals who later became hijackers but the significance of the data was not adequately recognized at the time.

Since 9/11 many systemic changes have been made to improve the watchlisting process and enhance information sharing within and across agencies.

Building on his false notion that information was intentionally withheld, Mr. Clarke went on to speculate--which he admits is based on nothing other than his imagination--that the CIA might have been trying to recruit these two future hijackers as agents. This, like much of what Mr. Clarke said in his interview, is utterly without foundation.

Many years after testifying himself at length before the 9/11 Commission and writing several books but making no mention of his wild theory, Mr. Clarke has suddenly invented baseless allegations which are belied by the record and unworthy of serious consideration.

We testified under oath about what we did, what we knew and what we didn't know. We stand by that testimony.

###

AP Review Finds No WikiLeaks Sources Threatened

CommonDreams.org

Published on Saturday, September 10, 2011 by the Associated Press
by Bradley Klapper and Cassandra Vinograd

WASHINGTON — Federica Ferrari Bravo's story of meeting American diplomats in Rome seven years ago hardly reads like a James Bond spy novel or a Cold War tale of a brave informant sharing secrets to help the United States.

In this July 14, 2011 photo, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange talks to members of the media during a news conference in central London. The U.S. has condemned the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks for putting lives in danger. But how many is unclear. An Associated Press review of some of the hundreds of U.S. diplomatic contacts deemed especially sensitive turns up several people who are either comfortable with their names out in the open or even surprised that their information was so highly valued, Friday, Sept. 9, 2011. So it came as a something of a surprise to her to hear that in one of the 250,000-odd State Department cables released by the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks, she was deemed a source so sensitive U.S. officials were advised not to repeat her name.

"I don't think I said anything that would put me at risk," the Italian diplomat said.

There are similar stories involving other foreign lawmakers, diplomats and activists cited in the U.S. cables as sources to "strictly protect."

An Associated Press review of those sources raises doubts about the scope of the danger posed by WikiLeaks' disclosures and the Obama administration's angry claims, going back more than a year, that the revelations are life-threatening. U.S. examples have been strictly theoretical.

The question of whether the dire warnings are warranted or overblown became more acute with the recent release all of the 251,287 diplomatic memos WikiLeaks held.

Tens of thousands of confidential exchanges were dumped, emptying a trove of documents. They were released piecemeal since last year, initially with the cooperation of a select group of newspapers and magazines that blacked out some names and information before publishing the documents.

The latest cables were published in full, without names blacked out. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland branded the action "irresponsible, reckless and frankly dangerous," and the U.S. said the release exposed the names of hundreds of sensitive sources.

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has blamed Britain's Guardian newspaper for publishing a secret encryption code, allowing intelligence agencies to access the cables and forcing WikiLeaks to provide the people affected the same information.

But the AP's review of the sources found several of them comfortable with their names in the open and no one fearing death. Others are dead, their names cited as sensitive in the context of long-resolved conflicts or situations. Some have written or testified at hearings about the supposedly confidential information they provided the U.S. government.

The AP survey is selective and incomplete; it focused on those sources the State Department seemed to categorize as most risky.

The AP did not attempt to contact every named source in the new trove. It's generally up to the embassies themselves to decide which identities require heightened vigilance, officials say.

Hadzira Hamzic, a 73-year-old Bosnian refugee, wasn't bothered about being identified as one of thousands of victims from the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

"I never hid that," she told the AP. "It is always hard when I have to tell about how I had been raped, but that is part of what happened and I have to talk about it."

In Asia, former Malaysian diplomat Shazryl Eskay Abdullah was shocked that an "unofficial lunch meeting" he had several years ago with a U.S. official meant his name ended up on a formal report. But he said his role in southern Thailand peace talks was well known. "I don't see why anyone would come after me," Shazryl said.

Ferrari Bravo's subject matter was also by no means mundane. A veteran of her nation's embassy in Tehran, Ferrari Bravo worked at the time on the Italian Foreign Ministry's Iran desk and discussed with the U.S. her government's view of the Iranian nuclear standoff. She urged continued dialogue.

"There is nothing that we said that was not known to our bosses, to our ministers, to our heads of state," she said. On having her identity protected, she said: "We didn't ask. There is nothing to protect."

U.S. officials say they have two criteria for sensitive sources. The first deals with people in totalitarian societies or failed states who could be imprisoned or killed, or perhaps denied housing, schooling, food or other services if exposed as having helped the United States.

The State Department also has sought to censor names of people who might lose their jobs or suffer major embarrassment even in friendly countries, if they were seen offering the U.S. candid insights or restricted information.

One such case involved the dismissal in December of a top aide to German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle after he provided details on coalition talks and debates over issues such as U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

Still, the total damage appears limited and the State Department has steadfastly refused to describe any situation in which they've felt a source's life was in danger. They say a handful of people had to be relocated away from danger but won't provide any details on those few cases.

Units throughout the department have been scouring the documents since last year to find examples where sources are exposed and inform them that they may be "outed." Some, such as Hamzic, Sharzyl and Ferrari Bravo, say they were never contacted. Presumably, endangered individuals would have been prioritized.

Clearly, sensitivities depend on context. Revelations that may cause personal or political discomfort for a U.S. embassy contact in Western Europe may be life-threatening for an informant in an undemocratic nation. In the cables, they may both be "strictly protected" sources, highlighting relative danger levels in different places.

In Vietnam, the U.S. seemed to be dealing with sources whose names demanded vigilance: the wife of a dissident sentenced to five years in prison; a Buddhist leader condemning the arrest of a fellow priest; a dissident who says people "held his family hostage" until he renounced his activism; a Christian preacher complaining of police pressure on him to renounce his faith; another who speaks of a colleague forcibly sent to a mental institute.

A Syrian human rights activist warned the U.S. of a looming crackdown on anti-government activists as far back as 2009. If the activist wasn't threatened by the disclosure last year, he may be now that the country is in the throes of a brutal five-month security operation.

In Mexico, the term "strictly protect" appeared to be attached to interlocutors indiscriminately, even when officials offered only flattering assessments of their government or said little that wasn't common knowledge. It perhaps makes more sense in the context of a country where organized crime networks have essentially fought an insurgency against the government, where allowing a valued source's name to get out could affect that person's safety.

Assange, an Australian, has defended his actions by saying no one has died as a result of WikiLeaks.

Current and former American officials say that argument misses the point.

Making people think twice before providing the U.S. with information — or simply refuse ever again to help — hurts the good causes of human rights and democracy that American officials are promoting, they argue.

Take Arnold Sundquist, a Swede whose life isn't in danger. He provided the U.S. Embassy with sensitive details on an Iranian attempt to buy helicopters and said he was unhappy that his actions were now public. Last year, Swedish media with access to the WikiLeaks trove reported on the incident but didn't mention him by name.

"It is what it is," he said. "I can't do anything about it."

But will he or others in a similar situation, be as ready to help American authorities again?

Venezuelan journalist Nelson Bocaranda thinks not. His identity was exposed in a document describing how he told the U.S. ambassador in 2009 that according to one of his sources, Colombian rebel leaders had visited Caracas for secret meetings with senior Venezuelan government officials. Bocaranda published the account in one of his newspaper columns.

"I feel betrayed by WikiLeaks," Bocaranda told the AP on Friday. But he said that as a journalist it's natural for him to talk with diplomats from various countries. "I think the ones who have been betrayed basically are the American diplomats," he said.

"It's going to be more difficult for them because I think no one is going to want to talk for fear of coming out in print with their name," he said, adding that would apply those who might otherwise supply sensitive information.

He said he doesn't feel his work or personal security face additional threats as a result of his name being exposed but said he suspects President Hugo Chavez's government could try to "cast doubts on me, to say that I am a member of the CIA."

Bocaranda said that he has nothing to hide and that the information he publishes in his newspaper columns and on the Internet is public. "I don't think my sources are going to shut me out," he said.

Other governments have echoed the U.S. criticism of WikiLeaks, saying it jeopardizes invaluable diplomacy — the exchanges that aim to promote understanding, avoid war and improve global security.

The anger from Assange's home nation, Australia, was prompted not by the release of sources, but of 23 Australians who had been in contact with a Yemen-based al-Qaida offshoot and were being monitored. Still, a government statement couldn't point to a direct threat from the disclosure, only a potential danger.

"The large-scale distribution of hundreds of thousands of classified United States government documents is reckless, irresponsible and potentially dangerous," Australian Attorney-General Robert McClelland said.

Vinograd reported from London. Associated Press writers Nicole Winfield in Rome; Sean Yoong in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Sabina Niksic in Sarajevo, Bosnia; Ian James in Venezuela; and Karl Ritter in Stockholm contributed to this report.

Thursday, September 1, 2011

How the Internet is destroying the middle class

andEdge





Topic:

Internet Culture

How the Internet is destroying the middle class

Artist and theorist Jaron Lanier argues that high-tech "innovations" are making us poorer and less ambitious



Monday, April 4, 2011

U.S. storage sites overfilled with spent nuclear fuel

AFACEAFACE

U.S. storage sites overfilled with spent nuclear fuel

71,862 tons, with more created every year, and no permanent disposal solution

The nuclear crisis in Japan has laid bare an ever-growing problem for the United States — the enormous amounts of still-hot radioactive waste accumulating at commercial nuclear reactors in more than 30 states.

The U.S. has 71,862 tons of the waste, according to state-by-state numbers obtained by The Associated Press. But the nation has no place to permanently store the material, which stays dangerous for tens of thousands of years.

Plans to store nuclear waste at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain have been abandoned, but even if a facility had been built there, America already has more waste than it could have handled.

Three-quarters of the waste sits in water-filled cooling pools like those at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear complex in Japan, outside the thick concrete-and-steel barriers meant to guard against a radioactive release from a nuclear reactor.

Spent fuel at Dai-ichi overheated, possibly melting fuel-rod casings and spewing radiation into the air, after Japan’s tsunami knocked out power to cooling systems at the plant.

The rest of the spent fuel from commercial U.S. reactors has been put into dry cask storage, but regulators only envision those as a solution for about a century and the waste would eventually have to be deposited into a Yucca-like facility.

The U.S. nuclear industry says the waste is being stored safely at power-plant sites, though it has long pushed for a long-term storage facility. Meanwhile, the industry’s collective pile of waste is growing by about 2,200 tons a year; experts say some of the pools in the United States contain four times the amount of spent fuel that they were designed to handle.

The AP analyzed a state-by-state summary of spent fuel data based on information that nuclear power plants voluntarily report every year to the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry and lobbying group. The NEI would not make available the amount of spent fuel at individual power plants.

While the U.S. Department of Energy previously reported figures on overall spent fuel storage, it no longer has updated information available. A spokesman for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which oversees nuclear power plant safety, said the agency was still searching for a compilation of spent fuel data.

The U.S. has 104 operating nuclear reactors, situated on 65 sites in 31 states. There are another 15 permanently shut reactors that also house spent fuel.

Four states have spent fuel even though they don’t have operating commercial plants. Reactors in Colorado, Oregon and Maine are permanently shut; spent fuel from all three is stored in dry casks. Idaho never had a commercial reactor, but waste from the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania is being stored at a federal facility there.

Illinois has 9,301 tons of spent nuclear fuel at its power plants, the most of any state in the country, according to industry figures. It is followed by Pennsylvania with 6,446 tons; 4,290 in South Carolina and roughly 3,780 tons each for New York and North Carolina.

Spent nuclear fuel is about 95 percent uranium. About 1 percent are other heavy elements such as curium, americium and plutonium-239, best known as fuel for nuclear weapons. Each has an extremely long half-life — some take hundreds of thousands of years to lose all of their radioactive potency. The rest, about 4 percent, is a cocktail of byproducts of fission that break down over much shorter time periods, such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, which break down completely in about 300 years.

How dangerous these elements are depends on how easily can find their way into the body. Plutonium and uranium are heavy, and don’t spread through the air well, but there is a concern that plutonium could leach into water supplies over thousands of years.

Cesium-137 is easily transported by air. It is cesium-137 that can still be detected in a New Jersey-sized patch of land around the Chernobyl reactor that exploded in the Ukraine in 1986.

Typically, waste must sit in pools at least five years before being moved to a cask or permanent storage, but much of the material in the pools of U.S. plants has been stored there far longer than that.

Safety advocates have long urged the NRC to force utility operators to reduce the amount of spent fuel in their pools. The more tightly packed they are, the more quickly they can overheat and spew radiation into the environment in case of an accident, a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.

Industry leaders say new technology has made fuel pools safer, and regulators have taken some steps since the 9/11 terror attacks to reduce fuel pool risks. Kevin Crowley, who directs the nuclear and radiation studies board at the National Academy of Sciences, says lessons will be learned from the crisis in Japan. And NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko says his agency will review how spent fuel is stored in the U.S.

A 2004 report by the academy suggested that fresh spent fuel, which is radioactively hotter, be spread among older, cooler assemblies in the spent fuel pool. “You’re buying yourself time, basically,” says Crowley. “The cooler ones can act as a thermal buffer.”

First Energy, which runs two nuclear power stations in Ohio and one in Pennsylvania, was able to reconfigure the spent fuel rods in its pools to make more room. Still, the company is now running out of space, says spokesman Todd Schneider. Ohio has 1,136 tons of spent fuel in pools and 37 tons in dry casks.

The casks in the U.S. are kept outdoors, generally on concrete pads, but industry officials insist they are safe. Unlike the pools, the casks don’t need electricity; they are cooled by air circulation.

One cask model, selling for $1.5 million, places spent fuel inside a stainless steel canister, which is placed inside an “overpack” — an outside shell composed of a layer of carbon steel, 27 inches of concrete and another layer of carbon steel. When in place, the system stands 20 feet tall and weighs 190,000 pounds, said Joy Russell, said spokeswoman for manufacturer Holtec International of Florida.

Russell said engineers have designed the system to withstand a crash from an F-16 fighter jet and survive the resulting jet fuel fire.

Plant operators in some states have moved aggressively to dry cask storage. Virginia has 1,533 tons of nuclear waste in dry storage and 1,105 tons in spent fuel pools. Maryland has 844 tons in dry storage and 588 tons in spent fuel pools.

Utilities in Texas, though, have not. There are 2,178 tons kept in spent fuel pools at reactor sites there, and zero in dry casks. In New York, 3,345 tons are in spent fuel pools while only 454 tons are in dry storage.

No cask is totally invulnerable, but the academy report found that radioactive releases from casks would be relatively low.

“If you attacked a fuel cask and managed to put a hole in it, anything that came out, the consequences would be very local,” Crowley said.

Casks can be licensed for 20 years, with renewals, said Carrie Phillips, spokeswoman for the Atlanta-based Southern Co., which has a dozen such casks at its two-reactor Joseph M. Farley plant near Columbia, Ala. She said officials have “every expectation” the casks could last “in excess of 100 years by design.”

But not the needed tens of thousands of years. For long-term storage, the government had looked to Yucca Mountain. It was designed to hold 77,160 tons — 69,444 tons designated for commercial waste and 7,716 for military waste. That means the current inventory already exceeds Yucca’s original planned capacity.

A 1982 law gave the federal government responsibility for the long-term storage of nuclear waste and promised to start accepting waste in 1998. After 20 years of study, Congress passed a law in 2002 to build a nuclear waste repository deep in Yucca Mountain.

The federal government spent $9 billion developing the project, but the Obama administration has cut funding and recalled the license application to build it. Nevadans have fiercely opposed Yucca Mountain, though a collection of state governments and others are taking legal action to reverse the decision.

Despite his Yucca Mountain decision, President Barack Obama wants to expand nuclear power. He created a commission last year to come up with a long-term nuclear waste plan. Initial findings are expected this summer, with a final plan expected in January.

“They are 13 years late,” says Terry Pickens, Director of Nuclear Policy at Xcel Energy, the Minneapolis-based utility that operates three reactors in Minnesota. Xcel is building steel-and-concrete cask containers to hold old waste on site, and suing the government periodically to pay for them. “We would like them to get done with what they said they would get done.”

Some countries — such as France, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom — reprocess their spent fuel into new nuclear fuel to help reduce the amount of waste.

The remaining waste is solidified into a glass. It needs to be stored in a long-term waste repository, but reprocessing reduces the volume of waste by three-quarters.

Because reprocessing isolates plutonium, which can be used to make a nuclear weapon, Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter put a stop to it in the U.S. The ban was later overturned, but the country still does not reprocess.

France produces 1,300 tons of nuclear waste per year, and reprocesses 940 tons. Still, fuel is only reprocessed once and then it, too, needs to be stored. France is expecting that engineers will eventually succeed in building a new type of nuclear reactor called a fast reactor that will use the waste it can’t reprocess as fuel.

“They’ve kicked the can down the road,” says Frank von Hippel, a director of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University.

Other countries, such as Germany, store spent fuel in casks. Finland is building a repository it says will store waste safely for 100,000 years.

Even though there is no long-term storage in the U.S., utility customers and taxpayers have been paying for it — twice.

Customers have paid $24 billion into a fund Congress established in 1982 to pay for such storage. The charge — a penny for every 10 kilowatt-hours — would typically add up to about $11 a year for a household that received all its electricity from nuclear plants.

Users pay as taxpayers, too — for dry storage. Utilities that have run out of storage space in pools successfully sued the federal government for breach of contract, because it failed to keep to the 1998 deadline to establish long-term storage. By law, the money for dry casks cannot come from the nuclear waste fund, and must come from the federal budget.