In Syria, Obama's Calculations Reveal Stupidity of US Imperialism

Published on Wednesday, August 28, 2013 by Common Dreams

In Syria, Obama's Calculations Reveal Stupidity of US Imperialism

As US and NATO plan aerial attack on Assad government, analyses expose cynical and dangerous mindset of those choosing war over peace

- Jon Queally, staff writer
  

Does the planned US/NATO attack on Syria serve a larger strategic goal than simply "saving political face"? Perhaps not, but that doesn't make it any less stupid, illegal, immoral, or repugnant. (AFP Photo/Chad R. Erdmann)



With the U.S. war machine in full gear for an expected air assault on Syria, and with a US media continuing to focus on the inevitability of such an attack but not the true reasons behind it, the fundamental question remains: Why would the U.S., backed by its NATO allies, carry out such a misguided, dangerous, and—not to put too fine a point on it—stupid military campaign?

Citing reasons strategic, legal, and moral—critics of a U.S.-led attack on Syria are being drowned out by major news outlets, many citing unnamed government sources, who say U.S. cruise missile attacks (and possibly a multi-day aerial bombing campaign) could begin as earlier as Thursday.

But why? To what end? Who benefits? And who will be left to suffer?

Though asking these questions may not determine definitive answers, there are at least three points of agreement among experts cautioning against war. First, the details of last week's use of a chemical agent outside remain unclear and government claims about intelligence on the matter should be received with high levels of skepticism. Second, even if the Assad government, or someone loyal to it, was responsible for the attack the idea that cruise missiles would be the appropriate response (legally, morally or otherwise) is simple not true. And lastly, there is simply no military solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

So what's the real goal of the attack on Syria?

Asked that question by Democracy Now's Amy Goodman on Wednesday, foreign policy analyst Phyllis Bennis—referencing Obama's August 2012 comment about use of chemical weapons being a "red line" in terms of U.S. military intervention—articulated this answer:

Well, it seems that the goal is a political goal. It’s to make a statement: "Oh, my god, I used a red line. I said there was a red line, I have to do something." And the only, quote, "something" that seems to be available is a military action.

But is that analysis—that this is all political cover for Obama in the face of neoconservative pressure or the fear that failure to "respond" with military might will look the U.S. look weak—too simplistic?

Perhaps. But Bennis is not alone in her assessment that what's really at stake in Syria is something overtly fundamental to U.S. power precisely because the calculations being made by the Obama administration to launch strikes are so clearly shrugging off the self-evident complexities and dangerous possibilities predicted to result from military action.
Put another way, the simple political calculation that Obama must "save face" is really an admission that what's most important in terms of U.S. foreign policy is that the potency of U.S. military power should never be questioned by potential rivals or made to look impotent by other nations.

The simple political calculation that Obama must "save face" is really an admission that what's most important in terms of U.S. foreign policy is that the potency of U.S. military power should never be questioned by potential rivals or made to look impotent by other nations.

In that context, as former CIA analyst Ray McGovern writes at Common Dreams, the real target of U.S. military action is not the Assad regime per se—but Iran.

"Obviously, there is concern about the human rights catastrophe in Syria," writes McGovern, "but is the main target Syria’s main ally, Iran, as many suspect?"

Parsing why both the U.S. and and neighboring Israel would risk triggering a regional war when both state that neither "regime change" nor protracted involvement in Syria's civil war is the goal, McGovern argues that,

Iran’s leaders need not be paranoid to see themselves as a principal target of external meddling in Syria. While there seem to be as many interests being pursued – as there are rag-tag groups pursuing them – Tehran is not likely to see the common interests of Israel and the U.S. as very complicated. Both appear determined to exploit the chaotic duel among the thugs in Syria as an opportunity to deal a blow to Hezbollah and Hamas in Israel’s near-frontier and to isolate Iran still further, and perhaps even advance Israel’s ultimate aim of “regime change” in Tehran.

What has long been known about the conflict within Syria is the manner in which it has served as a proxy war among both regional and world powers, but none of those players have played such a central and pernicious role in fueling global conflict in the last century than the U.S. military which time and time again has chosen military belligerence and imperial self-interest over the option of more peaceful pathways.

Indeed, as the Guardian's Seumas Milne argues, if the U.S., U.K. and their allies wanted peace in the region, they have a sadistic way of showing it. As he says, it "is the war itself"—the "death and destruction" of ongoing violence—that poses the great threat to Syria's people:

If the US, British and French governments were genuinely interested in bringing it to an end – instead of exploiting it to weaken Iran – they would be using their leverage with the rebels and their sponsors to achieve a ceasefire and a negotiated political settlement.
Instead, they seem intent on escalating the war to save Obama's face and tighten their regional grip. It's a dangerous gamble [...] 

Even if the attacks are limited, they will certainly increase the death toll and escalate the war. The risk is that they will invite retaliation by Syria or its allies – including against Israel – draw the US in deeper and spread the conflict. The west can use this crisis to help bring Syria's suffering to an end – or pour yet more petrol on the flames.

As many critics argue and Bennis expressed again Wednesday, the "notion that we are going to somehow escalate these attacks in Syria, rather than saying this is a moment when we desperately need diplomacy" is absurd.
Condemning the U.S. decision to cancel scheduled diplomatic talks with Russia on Wednesday, Bennis said the U.S. is wrong to stave off discussions or any possibility of peace talks.
"This is exactly the time" for such talks, she said, adding:

We need to be talking to Russia, to Iran, to all of the U.S. allies that are supporting the other side, to force the various parties to peace talks. There is no military solution. This is what Congresswoman Barbara Lee said yesterday, and it’s absolutely true. There is no military solution. Extra assaults from the United States is going to make the situation worse, is going to put Syrian civilians at greater risk, not provide protection.

So let the record show—if and when the U.S. bombs fall on Syria and the predicted death toll and violence spreads—that there was another choice for President Obama and his allies, but that helping to coordinate peace talks or fostering a negotiated settlement between the warring factions was just "something" that the U.S. simply refused to do.

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The Specter of Chemical and Biological Weapons

 

In-Depth Reports | Health

The Specter of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Efforts to harness the power of toxic chemicals and deadly organisms have been at the core of chemical and biological attacks throughout history. This package chronicles such incidents before Syria's recent alleged chemical weapon attack on civilians outside Damascus

August 22, 2013 |

 

 

The Specter of Chemical and Biological Weapons Efforts to harness the power of toxic chemicals and deadly organisms have been at the core of chemical and biological attacks throughout history. This package chronicles such incidents before Syria's recent alleged chemical weapon attack on civilians outside Damascus   » 

 

 

 

 

 

The Syrian civil war reached a nadir on August 21 when rockets with toxic chemical agents were launched at the suburbs of the Ghouta region just outside the capital city of Damascus. Officials have not yet confirmed how many died as a result of the chemical attack, but more than 100,000 lives have been claimed by the overall uprising since it broke out two years ago between supporters of Pres. Bashar al-Assad’s regime and those who called for his expulsion.

 

United Nations inspectors working to determine the nature of the deadly agents used in last week’s attack have faced multiple challenges, including delays in reaching the site where the blasts occurred. Having originally granted investigators permission to access the site on August 25, Syrian officials later said the team could not enter until 24 hours later. On August 26 the team managed to reach the site after coming under fire from unidentified snipers.

The setback could prove disastrous if the chemical remains of the weapons have evaporated or expired. But if perpetrators used a persistent nerve agent such as sarin, traces of the toxin should linger in the soil for up to 29 weeks.

Scientific American spoke with Charles Blair, senior fellow on state and nonstate terrorist threats with the Federation of American Scientists, about the challenges of pinning down a toxic culprit.

[An edited transcript of the interview follows.]

What happened at 2:00 A.M. in the Ghouta region of Syria on Wednesday, August 21?

There are some visuals, but apparently there were thuds or explosions releasing a chemical agent that was dispersed throughout the area, harming a large number of people in a small space. That begins the debate: What was it? There will never be a definitive answer. The U.N. team’s only charge was determining if there was a chemical agent or not, not who delivered it. But it’s pretty safe to say the attack was chemical. The battle is what people consider counts as proof.

What kind of testing is done to find out what chemicals were used in the attack? Is it all done on-site?

The team that goes in can either do on-site testing or they can take it to one of 20 facilities outside the country that are certified to conduct off-site testing. One of the benefits of off-site testing is that the devices there are usually more advanced. Usually they do a combination of both. So in this case you take a sample and split it into eight [parts], which are then sealed to prevent contamination. Two of the eight [parts] are analyzed on-site. One goes to the inspector state party, and one is sent to be analyzed off-site. Each sample is weighed and reweighed before and after shipment to ensure no tampering takes place.

The samples then go through gas chromatography–mass spectrometry (GC–MS) analysis, which breaks down the sample into its various chemicals. Then they identify them by comparing what they have with a database of more than 2,000 chemicals. [Editor’s note: A GCMS instrument comprises two parts. The gas chromatography (GC) component separates the chemical mixture into pure chemicals based on the ease with which they evaporate; the mass spectrometer (MS) identifies and quantifies the chemicals based on their structures.]

Is there an expiration date for detection of these chemicals?

If it was sarin, they have 29 weeks to detect the degradation components. There have been rumors that it’s too late to detect or that sarin evaporates. What happens is it goes into the soil. If there were bursts of sarin in the area say, nearby a crater, the bottom of that crater would be a great place to find sarin remnants. With such a large number of people killed in this attack, there is evidence that large amounts of the chemical—if it was sarin—was used. I expect it lingered in certain areas.

 

Is there a main degradation component that you look for when you’re looking for evidence that sarin may have been used in an attack?

 

The main one is IMPA, or isopropylmethylphosphonic acid. That’s the main chemical marker. There are others that exist, but as far as my research goes that’s the one I focus on.

Some experts have said it looks like a combination of the nerve agents sarin, used in two terrorist attacks in Japan in the 1990s, and VX, which some suspect was used in the Iran–Iraq War in 1980–88. Is that possible? Do you agree?

With VX we’re not sure. Some scientists think it’s more persistent, meaning it sticks around, but there’s also evidence that maybe it doesn’t. To my knowledge VX was not used in the Iran-Iraq War. What we do know is that VX can be up to 100 times more toxic than sarin. If we look at the history of chemical warfare, it used to be that you’d either want an agent that was persistent and did its business on the surface or you’d want a gas agent that did damage in the air quickly and dispersed. If VX were both of those things, that would be a game changer.

How easy is it to make these types of weapons?

It’s very challenging. Take Libya, for example. They had a chemical weapons program. The first thing they made in high quantities was mustard gas, which is poisonous and lethal, but is not terribly difficult to make. Then they tried nerve agents. That was just a bridge too far for them. One of the things that made it so difficult was that the U.S. was interfering with their ability to get the precursors, the materials they’d need to make the weapons in the first place. In the end they abandoned the effort and chose to rely on their nuclear program.

Syria and Israel are among the only countries not to have signed or ratified the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (Syria signed but never ratified and Israel never signed), which required signatories to stop bioweapons work and destroy existing stockpiles. Did this play a role in the attack?

There are seven states that have not signed. The significance of the Convention is its role in upholding a social construction of reality in which these sorts of weapons are viewed as beyond the pale, as taboo. The more people that adopt that narrative, the bigger the taboo becomes.

Syria was not a member, but it made sense for them not to be. They wanted a form of defense against Israel. They created a stockpile for defense against other states. I really don’t think they would ever have envisioned using it against insurgents. But because they are not a part of the Convention, and there’s no world government, they didn’t feel compelled not to use chemical weapons.

There are only three reasons I can think of that the regime would’ve done this: One, they have an incredibly complicated chess game that’s out of this world and somehow part of a rational strategy that I can’t understand. Two, this was an element of Pres. Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Or three, the regime itself is beginning to lose touch with reality, which can happen if you’re isolated. We’ve seen it happen to terrorist regimes over and over.

You can’t automatically accept any of the answers. So then you look at the opposition—they had a lot more to gain through the use of chemical agents. From their perspective, [the opposition] likely understood that it would trigger a large-scale U.S. intervention. So you could have had a situation where they said yes, people are going to die, but more will die if we don’t do this [to] trigger U.S. intervention.